NN Vohra Committee

Introduction:

The committee, headed by the then Union Secretary Home Secretary NN Vohra, was set up by the PV Narasimha Rao government in 1993 to examine the link between crime syndicates and government functionaries and political personalities. The committee that had members from RAW, the Intelligence Bureau as well as the CBI had unanimously expressed an opinion that during the 1993 bomb blasts, the criminal network in Mumbai was virtually running a parallel government.

The NN Vohra committee submitted its report to the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) on 5 October 1993, three months after it was established on 9 July 1993 in the aftermath of the 1993 Bombay bomb blasts. In a startling disclosure, the report had allegedly mentioned that many Congress leaders, who were in influential positions in Maharashtra and Gujarat in the 1990s had developed close relations with underworld don Dawood Ibrahim and his henchman Iqbal Mirchi.

The Vohra Committee, officially known as the Committee on the Prevention of National Security Risks Arising out of Economic Offences, was a government-appointed committee in India that was established in 1993 to investigate the activities of crime syndicates and mafia organizations that had developed links with and were being protected by government functionaries and political personalities. The committee was set up in response to the bomb blasts in Bombay in March 1993, which revealed the deep-rooted connections between criminal elements and various government departments.

The Vohra Committee Report describes Mirchi as, “Iqbal Mirchi of Bombay who, till the late 80s, was merely a visitor to passenger and carrier ships to obtain liquor and cigarettes for selling the same at a profit. In the last 3-4 years, Mirchi acquired real estate valuing crores of rupees; he has many bank accounts and has been paying lakhs of rupees to his carriers.”

“The growth of Mirchi is due to the fact that the concerned enforcement agencies did not timely take action against him and, later, this perhaps became difficult on account of the enormous patronage that he had developed. If Mirchi is investigated, the entire patronage enjoyed by him and his linkages will come to light.”

Key points regarding the Vohra Committee and its mandate include:

Composition: The committee was comprised of officials such as the Home Secretary, Secretary (Revenue), Director of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), Joint Secretary (Police Policy) from the Ministry of Home Affairs, and other members.

Objectives: The primary objective of the committee was to gather information on the activities and linkages of criminal syndicates and mafia organizations, and to recommend measures to address these national security risks.

Information Gathering: The committee was authorized to invite senior officers from relevant departments to gather the necessary information on these criminal activities and their connections with government officials.

Timeline: The committee was instructed to submit its report within three months of its formation.

Background: The committee was established following reports from intelligence and investigation agencies about the activities of the Dawood Ibrahim gang, particularly in the aftermath of the Bombay bomb blasts.

Need for Action: The committee emphasized the need to identify the linkages between criminal elements and government functionaries and to ensure that timely action could be taken in the future to prevent such activities.

Recommendations: The committee members were encouraged to provide their suggestions and recommendations regarding the establishment of a nodal agency to collect information on mafia organizations. It was proposed that agencies like the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW), Intelligence Bureau (IB), and CBI could share their data with this agency to facilitate more effective follow-up actions.

Key Highlights of the report:

Govt agencies, politicians, film stars and ISI – interlinked to stoke communal tensions

The 1993 NN Vohra report had stated that certain mafia elements have shifted to narcotics, drugs and weapon smuggling, thereby establishing the narco-terrorism network in India. We had recently reported how the Bollywood’s drug web had international links wherein the money was eventually used for narco-terrorism.

The NN Vohra Committee report stated that the cost of contesting elections made politicians depend on the underworld network. The 1993 bomb blasts in Mumbai and subsequent communal violence in Surat and Ahmedabad showed that the underworld exploited Pakistan’s ISI network in India to stoke communal tension in India. “The investigations into the Bombay bomb blast cases have revealed extensive linkages of the underworld in the various governmental agencies, political circles, business sector and the film world,” the report stated.

Dawood, Memon brothers and Bomb blasts

In his report, NN Vohra mentions through the reports which investigated linkages of Dawood Ibrahim and gang, it was apparent that “the activities of Memon Brothers and Dawood Ibrahim had progressed over the years, leading to the establishment of a powerful network. This could not have happened without these elements having been protected by the functionaries of the concerned Government departments, specially Customs, Income Tax, Police and others.”

Vohra report contains names of key political leaders, says intelligence officers

According to Intelligence Bureau (IB) officials, the report contains the names of leading politicians and bureaucrats who were the key players who helped Dawood and Mirchi from the 1970s till 1993.

“This information clearly showed how politicians were on the payroll of Dawood and how they were acting as his servants. Much of this information was produced in the Vohra committee report, in the portion which was not made public. We can understand why it was not made public before, but now, there is no political compulsion as such. It should have been presented before the public to show the deep nexus that existed between the politicians and Dawood,” a former IB official said.

Report mentions nexus between former Maharashtra CM and Dawood Ibrahim, say officials

The intelligence inputs given by the agencies at the time, had stated that there was a “definite” nexus between Dawood and a very big leader of Maharashtra since the late 1970s.

Interestingly, the Vohra report also had the name of a “former CM”. Another input that is a part of the annexures of the Vohra Committee report revealed how two tranches of Rs 5 crore each was given by Dawood in 1992 to a relative of a Chief Minister who later himself became a politician.

A former top IB officer said, “Gujarat-based leaders were prominently mentioned in the annexures. If the Home Minister decides to summon these annexures, if he has not seen them till now, he will find very familiar names in them. Every leader comes and makes statements on Dawood and Mirchi. The real test of intent is whether they have the guts to take action on the basis of what they already have—the findings of the Vohra committee that are encompassed in the annexures.”

Report of Director CBI under NN Vohra Committee

A Report on the nexus between the Bombay City Police and the Bombay under-world was prepared by CBI in 1986. It would be useful to institute a fresh study by CBI, on the basis of which appropriate administrative/ legal measures could be initiated.

Evolution of organized crime from local operation to political nexus and expansion: An organized crime Syndicate/Mafia generally commences its activities by indulging in petty crime at the local level, mostly relating to illicit distillation/gambling/organized betting and prostitution in the larger towns. In port towns, their activities involve smuggling and sale of imported goods and progressively graduate to narcotics and drug trafficking. In the bigger cities, the main source of income relates to real estate forcibly occupying lands/buildings, procuring such properties at cheap rates by forcing out the existing occupants/tenants etc. Over time, the money power thus acquired is used for building up contacts with bureaucrats and politicians and expansion of activities with impunity. The money power is used to develop a network of muscle-power which is also used by the politicians during elections.

Rise of Lawlessness and the Menace of Crime Syndicates Across India: CBI has reported that all over India crime Syndicates have become a law unto themselves. Even in the smaller towns and rural areas, muscle-men have become the order of the day. Hired assassins have become a part of these organizations. The nexus between the criminal gangs, police, bureaucracy and politicians has come out clearly in various parts of the country. The existing criminal justice system, which was essentially designed to deal with the individual offences/crimes, is unable to deal with the activities of the Mafia; the provisions of law in regard economic offences are weak; there are insurmountable legal difficulties in attaching/confiscation of the property acquired through Mafia activities

Combatting Crime Syndicates at Local and Central Agencies Join Forces for Effective Enforcement: It has been suggested that the menace has first to be tackled at the local level where the agencies of the State and the concerned Central Enforcement Agencies like Customs and Excise, Income Tax etc. would be required to take effective action. In cases where a crime Syndicate has graduated to big business, it would be necessary to conduct detailed investigations into its assets, both movable and immovable. It has been stressed that when such action is not timely and effectively taken, the lower functionaries of the concerned State and Central Departments/organizations start over-looking the activities of the crime Syndicates.

To elucidate this point, the Director CBI has given the example of IQBAL MIRCHI of Bombay who, till the late 80’s, was merely a visitor to passenger and carrier ships to obtain liquor and cigarettes for selling the same at a profit. In the last 3-4 years, MIRCHI acquired real estate valuing crores of rupees; he has many bank accounts and has been paying lakhs of rupees to his carriers. The growth of MIRCHI is due to the fact that the concerned Enforcement agencies did not timely take action against him and, later, this perhaps became difficult on account of the enormous patronage that he had developed. If MIRCHI is investigated, the entire patronage enjoyed by him and his linkages will come to light. Director CBI has observed that there are many such cases, as that of MIRCHI where the initial failure has led to the emergence of Mafia giants who have become too big to be tackled.

Telephonic Communications as Key Link Among International Mafias: Director CBI has stated that the main mode of communications/contacts of the Mafias operating at the international level is through telephonic communications. Referring to the useful leads emerging from the investigations into the activities of Dawood Ibrahim, a Mafia leader, the director CBI has stated that the effective monitoring of the telephone calls made from India/received from abroad would yield useful information and, for this being done, Government may grant sanction to monitor certain telephone connections.

Bank Collaboration Vital: Enforcing Reporting on Transactions and Suspicious Accounts: The assistance of Banks is an essential input. The Bank Managers can be placed under obligation to render reports on all heavy transactions and suspicious accounts to the Enforcement agencies. Such a practice obtains in UK.

Concluding his analysis, Director CBI has made the following suggestions to bring under control the activities of the criminal Syndicates:

1. Identification of offences and award of deterrent punishments, including preventive detention.
2. Trial procedures should be simplified and hastened.
3. Surveillance should be carried out through finger printing, photographs and dossiers.
4. Monitoring mechanisms should be established at the State and Central levels.
5. Establishment of Special Cells in the States CIDs and CBI.
6. Suitable amendments should be introduced in the existing laws to more effectively deal with the activities of Mafia organizations, etc.; this would also include review of the existing laws.
7. A detailed case study of l0-15 cases would provide useful information regarding the administrative/legal measures, which would be required to be taken to effectively tackle the functioning of Mafia organizations. The CBI can do this within a short period.

Report under the Director of Intelligence Bureau:

Identification of Nexus:

The first recommendation calls for the identification of the connections between criminals, mafias, anti-national elements, bureaucrats, politicians, and other influential individuals. Understanding these linkages is crucial to addressing the root causes of criminal influence in society and governance.

Nature and Modus Operandi:

Understanding the nature and methods of operation of these linkages is essential for developing effective strategies to disrupt and dismantle these networks. This involves analyzing how these connections are established, maintained, and utilized for various purposes.

Assessment of Impact:

Evaluating the impact of these criminal-political-bureaucratic linkages on different institutions is vital. This includes assessing their effects on electoral processes, political decision-making, economic activities, law enforcement, and administrative functions. Understanding these impacts helps in devising targeted interventions to mitigate the harm caused by these connections.

Foreign Intelligence Linkages:

Exploring any potential connections between domestic criminal networks and foreign intelligence agencies is crucial for understanding the full extent of the influence and activities of these networks. Addressing foreign linkages may require coordination with international partners and intelligence agencies.

Action to Counteract Mafia Activities:

Taking necessary and effective action to counteract and neutralize the activities of criminal syndicates and mafias is essential to uphold the rule of law and protect society from organized crime. This may involve enhanced law enforcement efforts, intelligence gathering, and legal measures to disrupt criminal operations.

Political and Legal Constraints:

Dealing with covert and illegal linkages between criminals, politicians, and bureaucrats can be challenging due to various political and legal constraints. Political considerations, legal loopholes, lack of accountability, and entrenched interests may hinder efforts to address these issues effectively. Overcoming these constraints requires political will, legal reforms, and institutional integrity.

Agency Responsibilities and Challenges:

Department of Revenue Agencies: The agencies under the Department of Revenue play crucial roles in combating economic offenses and enforcing laws related to customs, excise, income tax, and narcotics control.

Central Board of Excise & Customs (CBEC): Responsible for preventing smuggling, aided by the Director General of Revenue Intelligence (DGRI) and the Directorate General of Anti-Evasion (DGAE).

Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT): Administers tax laws like the Income Tax Act and Wealth Tax Act.

Central Economic Intelligence Bureau (CEIB): Coordinates intelligence gathering and enforcement actions related to economic offenses, focusing on identifying sources of black money and enhancing intelligence capabilities.

Enforcement Directorate: Enforces laws like the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, collects intelligence on foreign exchange offenses, and investigates violations.

Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB): Administers the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, focusing on drug trafficking and coordinating with law enforcement agencies at various levels.

Recommendation from the above narrated analysis, the following conclusions can be drawn

Proliferation of Crime Syndicates: On the basis of the extensive experience gained by our various concerned intelligence, investigative and enforcement agencies, it is apparent that crime Syndicates and Mafia Organizations have established themselves in various parts of the country.

Crime Syndicates’ Influence on Government, Politics, and Society: The various crime Syndicates /Mafia organizations have developed significant muscle and money power and established linkages with governmental functionaries, political leaders and others to be able to operate with impunity (as recently exemplified by the activities of the Memon Brothers and Dawood Ibrahim).

Lack of Sharing Intelligence on Crime Syndicates and Mafia Organizations: While the CBI and IB and the various agencies under the Department of Revenue, in their normal course of functioning, come across information relating to the linkages of crime Syndicates/Mafia organizations, there is presently no system under which they are expected to pass on such information to an identified nodal agency. Sharing of such information is presently of an occasional nature and no evidence is available of the same having been put to any operational use (the only mentionable exception perhaps relates to the recent investigations into the activities of Memon Brothers and the Dawood gang on which several of our agencies were put to work collectively).

Even where an agency comes across certain information about the linkages of crime Syndicates, it has no mandate to immediately pass it on to one or more agencies. An agency which comes across information regarding linkages is also apprehensive that the sharing of such information may jeopardize its own functioning through premature leakage. In sum, the various agencies presently in the field take care to essentially focus on their respective charter of duties, dealing with the infringement of laws relating to their organizations and consciously putting aside any information on linkages which they may come across.

Key Recommendations:

Establishment of Nodal Cell: The DIB has stated that while considering the establishment of any nodal mechanism, “It must be appreciated that the problems has enormous impact on national security and is indeed highly political in nature”. In this context, he has suggested that the nodal set up should be under the IB, which is even otherwise engaged in monitoring various political activities having a bearing on national security. He has recommended that “an exclusive Top-Secret Cell be established in the IB to function as the Nodal Group for receipt of inputs from various security/revenue agencies which reveal a politician-bureaucrat-underworld nexus. Such sharing will be through personal communications in writing, while operating difficulties could be sorted out through periodic meetings among the heads of these organizations to be chaired by the Home Secretary”. The Top Secret Cel1 will share all tactical and operational information with other concerned agencies on “need to know and act basis”.

Establishing a Secure Information Exchange Framework Among Intelligence and Revenue Agencies: The other approach recommended is to set up a system under which the Heads of the various Intelligence and Revenue agencies shall meet on a regular basis and exchange vital information, without there being any leakage.

Establishing a Centralized Nodal Point for Intelligence Sharing Among Enforcement Agencies: In the background of the discussions so far, there does not appear to be need for any further debate on the vital importance of setting up a nodal point to which all existing intelligence and Enforcement agencies (irrespective of the Department under which they are located) shall promptly pass on any information which they may come across, which relates to the activities of crime Syndicates.

Determining the Department for the Centralized Nodal Setup: If the preposition in the preceding para is sustained, a decision will need to be taken regarding the Department/Ministry under which the nodal set-up should be located.

Current Government Framework for National Security and Enforcement Agencies: Under the existing arrangements for the transaction of Government business, the Ministry of Home Affairs is responsible for all matters relating to internal security. It is for this reason that the Intelligence Bureau is a part and parcel of this Ministry (It is only by tradition that the DIB reports directly to authorities outside MHA). R&AW functions under the Cabinet Secretariat and deals with external intelligence. The various Intelligence, Investigation and Enforcement agencies dealing with the implementation of economic laws report to the Revenue Department under the Ministry of Finance. The CBI, which is the principal criminal investigation agency of the Centre, is under the Department of Personnel.

Safeguarding Confidentiality and Integrity of Intelligence within the Nodal Cell: In my view, considerable care would have to be taken to ensure that the information which becomes available to the Nodal Cell is handled by a very senior and trust-worthy officer. Any leakage of such information would not only jeopardize potential action against the powerful criminal Syndicates, but may also be susceptible to political exploitation. Under all circumstances, it will have to be ensured that the information available with the nodal set-up is used strictly and entirely for stringent action against the crime Syndicates, without allowing any scope whatever of its being exploited for political gain.

Establishing a Confidential Nodal Setup under MHA for Coordinated Intelligence Handling: In the preceding context, it would be logical if the nodal set-up is under the MHA, directly handled by the Home Secretary who can be assisted by one or more selected officers of the Ministry for the collation and compilation of all information received from IB, CBI, R&AW and the various agencies under the Department of Revenue The manner in which such information is operationalized would need to be confidentially discussed with the concerned Heads of Organization and, as necessary, with Secretary (Revenue). It will also need to be ensured that the nodal set-up functions with extreme secrecy. Needless to say, any leakage whatever about the linkages of crime Syndicate senior Government functionaries or political leaders in the states or at the center could have a destabilizing effect on the functioning of Government. As such, it would not appear prudent to entrust the functioning of the Nodal Cell to any level below that of the Home Secretary. Further, the government would also have to carefully consider and prescribe the authorities to whom the Home Secretary will report in regard to the sensitive information received by the nodal set-up as well as regarding the operations to be launched by one or more of the concerned agencies to apprehend, investigate and prosecute the offenders.